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Transnational Investment by Institutions
By DAVID L. RATNER*
Recent years have witnessed two important trends in the securities
markets-institutionalization and internationalization. The focus of this
paper is the interaction of these two phenomena-in particular, the in-
vestment by three major classes of United States institutional investors in
securities of foreign issuers, the legal or other obstacles that may be in-
hibiting cross-border investment, and the implications of a substantial
increase in transnational investment.
The three types of institutional investors examined are those which
are the most prominent in the equity markets-mutual funds, pension
funds, and insurance companies. As of March 31, 1992, pension funds
held approximately $2,563 billion in financial assets (of which private
pension funds accounted for approximately two-thirds), insurance com-
panies held approximately $2,096 billion (of which more than 70% was
held by life insurance companies), and mutual funds held approximately
$1,483 billion.
There are no authoritative figures available to indicate the percent-
age of investment in non-U.S. securities. However, figures or estimates
supplied by the trade associations or regulatory agencies indicate that
mutual funds have approximately 5% of their assets invested abroad,
private pension funds approximately 5%, and life insurance companies
approximately 2%.
I. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
In view of the relatively small amount of investment in foreign
stocks and bonds by these three groups of institutions, it is appropriate to
examine the regulatory structures governing them to ascertain the extent
to which those regulations may be directly or indirectly inhibiting foreign
investment.
A. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are regulated by the U.S. Securities & Exchange Corn-
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mission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and provisions of
other federal securities laws. The Investment Company Act does not
limit the types of securities in which mutual funds can invest; it requires
only that the fund follow the investment policy it has adopted and adver-
tised to purchasers of shares in the fund.
The investment mix of mutual funds has changed greatly over the
past twenty years. In 1968, 90% of mutual fund asnets were invested in
stock. In 1992, as a result of the rapid growth of bond funds, corporate
stock accounted for only 47% of non-money market mutual fund assets,
with U.S. government securities, tax-exempt state and local government
obligations, and corporate bonds each accounting for between 15% and
18%.
In general, non-specialized equity and bond funds limit their invest-
ments to U.S. securities. However, there are a significant number of "in-
ternational" or "global" funds managed by the major fund advisory
organizations. "International" funds are those which invest solely in for-
eign securities; they may invest either in any foreign securities or only in
the securities of a particular country or region. "Global" funds-which
are usually bond funds-can invest in either U.S. or foreign securities,
and vary their percentage of foreign investment depending on the prevail-
ing interest rates in different countries and their expectations as to the
future trend of the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the cur-
rency in which the bonds are denominated. The Investment Company
Institute has estimated that approximately 2% of total mutual fund as-
sets are in international funds and approximately 5% in global funds.
One factor inhibiting mutual fund investment in foreign securities is
that the funds make a continuous offering of their shares at a price re-
lated to net asset value, and must therefore compute their net asset value
daily (or more frequently). This means that any foreign security in
which the mutual fund invests must be traded in an active market which
provides current market prices through U.S. vendors and must be de-
nominated in a currency that is freely convertible into U.S. dollars at a
rate that is always ascertainable. Securities that do not meet these re-
quirements can only be purchased by "closed-end" investment compa-
nies, which do not make continuous offerings of their shares and are less
popular with investors.
B. Pension Funds
Pension funds fall into two categories-"private" pension funds,
which cover non-governmental workers, and "public" pension funds,
which cover employees of state and local governmental entities. The pri-
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vate pension funds are regulated by the Department of Labor under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); the public pension
funds are exempt from ERISA and are regulated under the laws of the
states in which they are located.
ERISA does not directly specify the kinds of securities in which
pension funds may invest; it requires that the fund be managed by one or
more "fiduciaries," who are required to invest fund assets (a) for the ex-
clusive purpose of benefiting the participants in the plan, (b) with the
degree of care that a prudent investor would use in the same circum-
stances, (c) by diversifying so as to limit the risk of large losses, and (d) in
accordance with the instruments governing the plan. The diversification
requirement would seem to support overseas investment; however, the
question is whether such investments might be considered "imprudent."
Courts interpreting the "prudence" test have not always been clear on
whether the test applies to each security in which the fund invests or to
the portfolio as a whole. If the test applies to each individual investment,
it would be more difficult and/or more costly for the fiduciaries to obtain
sufficient information about the foreign issuers to establish that they ac-
ted "prudently." As a result, foreign investment would be inhibited. On
the other hand, if it applies to the portfolio as a whole, investment in a
mix of foreign and domestic securities would be a prudent means of
guarding the fund against a decline in the U.S. economy.
Private pension funds have always invested heavily in common
stocks. In 1968, common stocks accounted for 60% of their assets. By
1992, that figure had shrunk to 47%, with U.S. government securities
accounting for 15%, and corporate bonds accounting for 11%. State and
local government funds were not traditionally investors in common
stocks, having only 12% of their assets in stock in 1968. By 1992, how-
ever, that percentage had increased to 44% (almost on a par with private
pension funds), with 28% in U.S. government securities and 22% in cor-
porate bonds.
Private pension funds have invested substantial amounts in foreign
securities, and recent studies indicate that many plan to increase foreign
investment in the future. In many instances, management of the private
pension fund is contracted out to professionals-investment advisers,
banks, or insurance companies-that have the resources and the volume
to make adequate investigation of foreign securities and issuers.
C. Insurance Companies
Insurance companies fall into two categories-life insurance compa-
nies and casualty insurance companies. As a result of an early Supreme
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Court decision (which was overruled almost a centuiy later) holding that
insurance is not "commerce," insurance companies are regulated solely
by the states. Even though many large insurance companies sell their
policies on a nationwide basis, there is no direct regulation of insurance
companies by the federal government.
State regulation of investment by insurance companies generally fol-
lows a "legal list" approach. A typical state insurance law spells out in
detail the kinds of securities in which insurance companies can invest,
ostensibly for the purpose of preventing them from making "unsafe" in-
vestments. Traditionally, life insurance companies, which enjoy special
status under the income tax laws, have invested the major portion of
their portfolios in corporate bonds and mortgages on real estate. On the
other hand, casualty insurance companies, which are fully taxed on their
investment income and generally not as tightly resticted with regard to
the types of securities in which they can invest, have traditionally in-
vested heavily in tax-exempt state and local government obligations and
in corporate stock and bonds.
In 1992, life insurance companies had 40% of their assets invested
in corporate bonds, 18% in mortgages on real estate, 16% in U.S. gov-
ernment securities, and only 7% in common stocks. Casualty insurance
companies, on the other hand, had 25% of their assets invested in tax-
exempt state and local government securities, 22% in U.S. government
securities, 19% in common stocks, and 18% in corporate bonds.
With respect to investment in non-U.S. securities, the state laws gen-
erally permit investment of up to a specified percentage of the company's
assets in certain non-U.S. securities which meet certain "quality" stan-
dards. For example, Section 1404 of the New York Insurance Law per-
mits life insurance companies to invest their "reserve funds" in foreign
securities "which are substantially of the same kinds, classes and invest-
ment grades as those [domestic] securities which are eligible for invest-
ment." However, life insurance companies are limited to investing not
more than 10% of their assets in Canadian securities, and not more than
1% (in the aggregate) in all other foreign issues, except that if a company
is conducting an insurance business in another country, it may invest in
that country up to either (a) the amount which it is required by law to
invest in that country, or (b) 1.5 times the amount of its reserves and
other obligations under insurance contracts written in that country. Cal-
ifornia is more restrictive. Section 1194.6 of its Insurance Code permits
an insurer to invest its "excess funds" in bonds and notes of foreign issu-
ers only if the issuer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. company and
payment in full is guaranteed by the U.S. parent.
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In recent years, there have been two major changes in the marketing
strategy of life insurance companies, resulting in significant changes in
their investment practices. First, starting in the 1950s, insurance compa-
nies began offering "variable" annuities and life insurance policies in
which the payouts were not fixed but fluctuated depending on the per-
formance of a portfolio of securities in a "separate account." These ac-
counts are not subject to the investment restrictions found in the
insurance laws. Further, they are generally heavily invested in equity
securities. Second, life insurance companies are now much more in-
volved in the pension and annuity business than in traditional life insur-
ance. In 1990, approximately 49% of the premium income of U.S.
insurance companies came from annuities, while only 29% came from
life insurance, with the remaining 22% coming from health insurance.
Of the annuity income, approximately 60% came from group annuities
and pension plans. Because the group pension plan business is highly
competitive, life insurance companies have become much more aggres-
sive in their investment policies, investing heavily in high-yield, high-risk
investments that enable them to offer pension plans at lower rates than
their competitors. The recent bankruptcies of two large life insurance
companies, attributable largely to the collapse of the market for high-
yield corporate "junk" bonds in which they had heavily invested, has
resulted in calls for tighter regulation of insurance company investments,
possibly by the federal government.
II. OTHER INHIBITIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMEENT
In addition to the laws and regulations that directly restrict the abil-
ity of U.S. institutions to invest in foreign securities and the ability of
foreign institutions to invest in U.S. securities, there are other laws which
indirectly impact such investment.
A. Taxes
The income tax laws of some countries provide for the withholding
of taxes on dividends or interest paid to securityholders in other coun-
tries. This withholding may make foreign investments less attractive
than domestic investments with comparable yields.
B. Disclosure
Provisions added to the Securities Exchange Act in 1968 require re-
ports from any person or institution which acquires more than 5% of the
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stock of any publicly-traded U.S. corporation. While this would not nec-
essarily inhibit foreign institutions from taking equity positions in the
large U.S. companies, it might well inhibit their investment in smaller
companies, where they would need to acquire more than 5% to make an
investment sufficient to justify their costs in investigating the issuer's
potential.
C. Liquidity
In making investments, most institutions are concerned with liquid-
ity-the ability to dispose of the security in the market if their investment
objectives or portfolio strategies change. Generally, the institutions will
want to dispose of securities in the markets with which they are familiar
and in which they have confidence. For U.S. institutions, this usually
means the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ system in the
case of stocks, and the U.S. dealer market in the case of bonds. However,
under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, securities of non-gov-
ernmental issuers can be publicly offered and traded in the U.S. only if
they are registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC),
which requires that the issuer provide financial and other information in
the form specified by the SEC. Many foreign issuers are unwilling to
subject themselves to these disclosure requirements, and consequently do
not take the steps necessary to permit their securities to be publicly
traded in the U.S.
To alleviate this problem, in 1990, the SEC adopted Rule 144A,
which permits the trading of securities without requiring any disclosure
by the issuer as long as all sales of the securities are made to qualified
large institutions-generally defined as institutions with more than $100
million in investments. This rule, which applies to any class of securities
not listed on a U.S. stock exchange or the NASDAQ system, has report-
edly resulted in a significant increase in sales of foreign securities to U.S.
institutions.
U.S. issuers may also be deterred from making offerings of their se-
curities to foreign institutions if they are required to comply with disclo-
sure requirements that apply when making an offering in the U.S. In
1964, the SEC issued a release setting forth the conditions under which a
U.S. issuer could make an offering overseas without complying with the
Securities Act of 1933. Regulation S, adopted by the SEC in 1990, elabo-
rated and codified these conditions, making it easier for U.S. issuers to
tailor offerings for the Eurobond and other overseas markets.
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III. TRANSNATIONAL MARKETING OF
INVESTMENT SERVICES
An alternative to transnational investment by institutions is to per-
mit institutions to market their services in other countries. For example,
an individual U.S. investor wishing to invest in a portfolio of securities of
companies located in a particular country or region could invest either in
a U.S. mutual fund concentrating on investments in that country or re-
gion, or invest in a fund based in that country or region which invests in
its own "local" securities. Thus far, however, the opportunities for using
the latter method have been limited.
A. Mutual Funds
Because of the significant differences between the way in which mu-
tual funds are regulated under the U.S. Investment Company Act of
1940 and the ways in which comparable funds are regulated in other
countries, it is virtually impossible for a fund organized in any foreign
country (except Canada) to obtain the necessary authorizations to offer
its shares in the United States. The U.S. requirements with respect to
management fees and other charges, and the major role assigned to in-
dependent directors, are so different from the regulatory approaches fol-
lowed in Europe and Asia that foreign funds find it very difficult to
comply with them. In May 1992, however, the SEC issued a staff report
recommending that the Investment Company Act be amended to permit
the SEC to enter into bilateral understandings with fund regulators in
other countries, and to make it easier for foreign funds to market their
shares in the U.S.
With respect to investments in U.S. securities by residents of other
countries, at the present time Germany and Switzerland are the only
countries in which U.S. mutual funds can effectively market their serv-
ices. One large U.S. fund adviser obtained permission in 1991 to sell mu-
tual fund shares in Japan, but with the proviso that it could only sell
funds specially designed for the Japanese market (not its regular well-
known funds) and could only market its shares through brokers, rather
than through the direct sales techniques heavily utilized in the United
States. Further, the SEC's long legal battles with Geneva-based Fund of
Funds in the 1960s and 1970s indicate that the Commission would not
look favorably on "offshore" funds established to market shares of U.S.
mutual funds.
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B. Insurance Companies
Life insurance companies and casualty insurance companies, both in
the U.S. and other countries, have been expanding their foreign activities
aggressively in recent years, not by direct sales but by establishing or
acquiring foreign insurance companies. In 1988, the latest year for
which figures are available, the premium and investment income of U.S.-
owned life insurers in other countries amounted to more than $9 billion.
In 1989, foreign-owned insurers had premium income of $22.6 billion
from sales in the U.S., accounting for about 6% of the total. With re-
spect to casualty insurance, U.S.-owned companies had $16.2 billion of
sales in foreign markets in 1988, and foreign-owned companies had $32.8
billion of sales in the U.S. in 1989, accounting for about 15% of the total.
This percentage is expected to increase significantly due to the recent
purchases of several large U.S. insurance companies by foreign interests.
The purchase of a U.S. insurer by a foreign insurer, or vice versa,
does not necessarily increase the amount of transnational investment in
portfolio securities by the individual companies themselves. However,
the growth in the number of foreign-owned U.S. insurers is likely to re-
sult in pressure on regulators to liberalize foreign investment by the U.S.
subsidiaries, particularly in the country or region in which the parent
company is located.
IV. IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENT
BY INSTITUTIONS
As institutional investors have come to own an increasingly large
percentage of the shares of major U.S. corporations, and to account for
an increasingly large percentage of the trading in those shares, they have
had a major impact on both the markets in which the shares are traded
and the control structure of the corporations themselves.
A. Impact on the Market
Investment by institutions can create problems ifr the investing insti-
tutions come to dominate a market, or if they engage in trading practices
which have a destabilizing effect. Studies of the sharp and sudden drops
in the U.S. stock markets in 1987 and 1989 indicate that trading prac-
tices followed by some institutions, such as "program trading," "index
arbitrage," and "portfolio insurance," may have signifcantly exacerbated
market swings. While most of this type of trading was done by U.S.
money managers, it was recently reported that Normura Securities, the
largest Japanese securities firm, had become a major program trader in
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the New York market. Ironically, Nomura Securities engages in very
little program trading in the Tokyo market, where most program trading
is done by large U.S. firms such as Salomon Brothers and Morgan Stan-
ley. Reportedly, Nomura's reluctance to engage in program trading in
Tokyo is attributable to the political unpopularity of the practice, which
some Japanese have blamed for a large part of the decline of more than
50% in the Tokyo market since 1989.
Unusual rules governing particular classes of institutions can also
have strange effects on stock markets. For a time, Japanese insurance
companies, which were subject to regulations permitting them to pay div-
idends only out of realized income, were buying and selling U.S. stocks in
large quantities for the purpose of "buying dividends." This practice in-
volved buying the U.S. stock immediately before the record date for a
dividend, then selling the stock immediately after the record date at the
same price reduced by the amount of the dividend. On certain days,
these transactions amounted to as much as one-third of the total reported
volume on the New York Stock Exchange. While there was no attempt
to manipulate stock prices - indeed, the whole purpose was to buy and
resell at the same price (adjusted for the dividend) - the practice did
result in distorting the volume of trading reported for individual stocks
and for the market as a whole.
B. Impact on Corporate Issuers
As institutions have accumulated larger and larger percentages of
the stock of major corporations-between 80% and 90% in many
cases-there has been increasing concern about the role they are playing,
and the role they should play, in "monitoring" corporate managements
and improving the economic performance of U.S. industry. During the
takeover binge of the 1980s, the willingness of institutions to tender their
shares to corporate raiders facilitated the takeover and restructuring of
many large companies, with mixed results. Proponents of takeovers
point to increased efficiency at corporations which were subjected to, or
threatened with, takeovers. Critics, however, emphasize the economic
disruption that resulted when the economy turned down and the target
companies, unable to service the mountains of debt that were piled on
them to finance the takeovers, were forced to seek protection under the
bankruptcy laws.
In any event, the demise of the "junk bond" market and other fac-
tors have greatly reduced the number of hostile takeovers. The debate
has now shifted to the question of whether institutions should move away
from the traditional "Wall Street rule"-i.e., if you don't like the way the
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management is running the company, sell the stock--and toward a more
active role in trying to improve the performance of poorly-managed com-
panies without waiting for the "shock therapy" of a takeover attempt.
The banks, insurance companies, and investment advisers who man-
age most private pension assets have shown little enthusiasm for taking a
more active role in corporate governance questions. And indeed it is
hard to see what is in it for them. The extra cost of undertaking that
function would handicap them in the price-sensitive competition for fund
management. In addition, the short-term orientation of most money
managers and their clients discourages activities which will show results,
if any, only in the long term. Finally, the pension plan fiduciaries to
whom they market their services are often the corporate executives who
strongly resist any expansion of the shareholders' role in corporate
governance.
The groups of institutions which are least affected by these pressures
are the state and local government pension funds, which are managed by
government officials who can see political advantage in criticizing corpo-
rate managements and calling for improvements in governance structure.
It is therefore not surprising that those funds, led by the California Pub-
lie Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), have been the most ac-
tive in seeking a larger voice for shareholders in basic corporate
decisions.
Whether this pressure will result in any significant changes in corpo-
rate governance practices remains to be seen. Its significance for transna-
tional investment, however, is that if foreign institutions come to own a
significant percentage of the shares of major U.S. corporations, political
pressures against an expanded institutional role in corporate governance,
which might be viewed as a kind of foreign takeover of U.S. companies
may be heightened. However, the experience of financial institutions in
Japan and the European Community, which have traditionally taken a
larger role in the management of companies in which they invest, suggest
that a similar role for financial institutions in the U.S. may have benefi-
cial effects and might improve the competitiveness of U.S. industry.
Whichever way it plays out, the possibilities of this development are
intriguing.
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